



Rescuing Alabama's PACT Program

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Introduction

Since 2007, Alabama's Prepaid Affordable College Tuition (PACT) program has lost almost a quarter of a billion dollars of its value, more than any other state with a similar program. Not only has this 30 percent loss compromised the program's ability to pay college tuition and fees for investors; it raises serious questions regarding the investment strategies of the PACT Board. In this paper, the following questions are answered:

- What is the Alabama PACT?
- How did the current recession affect Alabama's PACT program and similar programs in other states?
- Was Alabama's PACT investment structure adequate to meet its obligations?
- Is Alabama's PACT investment structure different from similar programs in other states?
- What steps can be taken to make Alabama's PACT solvent?

What is the Alabama PACT Program?

Alabama's PACT program was started in 1990 as a savings plan to help parents or guardians of children in Alabama pay for their in-state college tuition and fees.¹ The program is managed through the Alabama State Treasury by a 10-member board of directors, which includes the State Treasurer and the Lieutenant Governor.² As of September 2009, there were 45,542 active PACT contracts.³ New enrollment in the PACT program has been suspended since January 2009 because of the program's financial problems.⁴

The advantage of the PACT program is that it allows parents to lock in tuition rates prior to their child's enrollment. To pay for tuition credits, the PACT program has three investment plan options. When the time comes for the child to attend college, payments for their tuition and necessary fees are made directly from the PACT account to the institution the child attends.

¹ "Section 529 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 authorizes states to create two types of college savings programs – prepaid tuition plans and college savings plans. Alabama was the third state in the nation to implement a prepaid college tuition program when the PACT program began operating in March 1990." Source: Alabama State Treasury, "About PACT." 2010. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/yahzg76>. Access verified March 22, 2010.

² At present, the members of the PACT Board of Directors are: Kay Ivey (Chairman), State Treasurer; Willie Huff (Vice Chairman); Jim Folsom, Lieutenant Governor; Freida Hill, Chancellor, Alabama College System; Gregory Fitch, Director, Alabama Commission on Higher Education; Ricky Jones; Tom Broughton; Daniel Hughes; and Russell Buffkin. Source: Alabama State Treasury, "PACT." 2010. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/ybap4yn>. Access verified March 22, 2010.

³ Alabama State Treasury, "Alabama's Prepaid Affordable College Tuition Program: Annual Actuarial Valuation: September 30, 2009." Available at <http://tinyurl.com/ydv2hrx>. Access verified April 8, 2010.


⁴ *Ibid.* At present, eight of the 13 prepaid tuition programs covered in this paper have open enrollment.

How Did the Current Recession Affect Alabama's PACT Program?

Every pre-paid college tuition program in the nation operates under an investment policy which dictates the amount of money that can be invested in equities (e.g., stocks and mutual funds), fixed income funds (e.g., bonds), and other investments (e.g., real estate, cash, or cash equivalents such as money market accounts).⁵

Even prior to the current recession⁶, Alabama's high ratio of equities to fixed income funds set it apart from similar programs across the nation. While the national average for tuition programs in 2007 was 59.3 percent equities, Alabama's PACT program was 72 percent (See Chart 1). Only Mississippi had a higher percentage of equities (78.3 percent).

Chart 1: Equity Investments as a Percent of Prepaid Tuition Programs, by State: 2007



Historically, equity investments provide higher returns, but also come with higher risk. According to a March 2009 memorandum by Callan Associates, an investment consultant to Alabama's PACT program, the program's losses were tied directly to its heavy dependence on equities:

⁵ Of the 20 prepaid college tuition programs currently in the United States, only 13 are examined in this report. Programs were not included if (1) they were national programs; (2) they were not true 529 programs in that they did not invest in equities or fixed income instruments; (3) they had stopped accepting both new enrollments and contributions; or (4) the organizational body governing the program did not have and/or did not provide sufficient financial information to make comparisons from 2007 to 2009. For a listing of all pre-paid college tuition plans in the nation, as well as the reasons some were excluded from this study, Appendix A.

⁶ According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the current recession officially began in December 2007. Source: Economists' View, "When Did the Recession Begin?" December 1, 2008. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/yz7pymd>. Access verified April 8, 2010.

The bursting of the largest housing bubble in history had resulted in massive de-leveraging by institutions, corporations, and individuals. The de-leveraging process has spurred widespread selling of both financial and real assets, causing a rapid decline in asset values and wealth destruction all around the world. The year 2008 was one of the worst and most volatile years for equity markets on record... [It] was by far the most difficult year for the PACT plan as it, like other institutional plans in the U.S., saw its assets decline significantly. The program lost 31 percent of its market value in 2008. The bulk of the losses were experienced in a rather short time—September through November—as markets across the world tumbled rapidly after the failure of Lehman Brothers. The extreme market conditions spared no one and other public plans suffered significant losses as well....Most pension funds and state prepaid plans are now facing similar issues as [PACT programs], going from close to or fully funded to an underfunded—in some case, significant—status.⁷

Was Alabama's PACT Investment Structure Adequate to Meet Its Obligations?

It is reasonable to question why the PACT program decided to invest in an above-average ratio of equities to fixed income investments. According to the Callan Associates memorandum, the PACT Board's decision to maintain a high ratio of equities was based on the assumption that better investment returns were going to be needed to pay for increasingly expensive college and university costs:

The result of our asset and liability studies indicated that the PACT program needed to maintain an equity allocation greater than that to fixed income, given the higher actuarial discount rate and the high level of expected tuition inflation.⁸

Indeed, during the two most recent school years (2007-08 and 2008-09), Alabama's tuition and fees for resident, undergraduate students increased 10.4 percent and 10.9 percent respectively, the largest increases on record in the state in several years. In fact, Alabama's 10.9 percent increase last school year was the third largest one-year increase in the nation; only Arizona and Maine had higher tuition increases.⁹

There are at least two reasons, though, why the past two years of above-average tuition rates do not exonerate the PACT Board or the investment advisors that convinced them to put a disproportionate amount of their funds into equities.

⁷ Callan Associates, "Memorandum to the Alabama PACT College Saving Plan Board." March 12, 2009. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/yjh5fyy>. Access verified March 23, 2010.

⁸ Callan Associates, "Memorandum to the Alabama PACT College Saving Plan Board."

⁹ Washington Higher Education Coordinating Board, "2008-2009 Tuition and Fee Rates: A National Comparison." March 2009. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/yzb6f3h>. Access verified April 1, 2010.

First, the actuarial assumptions used by PACT for the past few years do not agree with the expectation of dramatically higher tuition rates. If the cost of tuition is increasing at a rate significantly higher than in the past, higher actuarial assumptions and the consequent higher contributions by participants should have been assumed and acted on years ago. They were not. According to the PACT program's 2009 financial report, future tuition increases have been estimated at 7.45 percent per year, only a fraction higher than earlier projections of 7.25 percent.¹⁰ If 10-percent-or-greater increases in tuition costs are the new expectation for paying for college in Alabama, assuming a much smaller growth rate virtually guarantees that the PACT program will remain underfunded forever.

Second, if the PACT Board intended to combat rising tuition rates by putting a higher percentage of its funds in equities, other states that also reported higher increases in tuition should have invested even more than Alabama. They did not. According to a March 2009 report by the Washington Higher Education Coordinating Board, Alabama's average tuition and fees for resident, undergraduate students at four-year schools increased a total of 28.4 percent in the past four years. This is almost identical to the average, national four-year increase of 29 percent, and lower than the 33.6 percent average growth in tuition rates of the states examined in this report (See Table 3).¹¹ In fact, of the 13 states in this report, Alabama's increase in tuition and fees ranked ninth.

Table 3: Four-Year Increases in Resident, Undergraduate Tuition and Required Fees, 2004-05 to 2008-09, and 2007 Prepaid Tuition Program Equity Ratio, by State¹²

State	Four-Year Increase in Tuition and Fees		2007 Equity Ratio	
	Percent	Rank	Equity Ratio	Rank
Alabama	28.4%	9	72.0%	2
Florida	23.4	10	7.2	13
Illinois	53.6	1	65.1	5
Kentucky	50.8	2	59.4	10
Maryland	21.5	13	68.8	3
Michigan	42.9	3	65.4	4
Mississippi	22.2	11	78.3	1
Nevada	40.0	4	55.0	11
South Carolina	37.8	5	60.0	7
Virginia	33.0	6	60.0	7
Tennessee	31.4	7	54.0	12
Washington	22.1	12	60.6	6
West Virginia	30.1	8	60.0	7
Average	33.6%		58.9%	

¹⁰ Under the report's assumptions, investments in the PACT program would earn at least 8.55 percent annually, enough to cover the projected increases, with a small margin of error left over in the event of a few unexpected, above-average increases. Source: Alabama State Treasury, "Alabama Prepaid Affordable College Tuition Program: Financial Report." September 30, 2009, p. 17. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/yh43lyo>. Access verified April 1, 2010.

¹¹ Washington Higher Education Coordinating Board, "2008-2009 Tuition and Fee Rates: A National Comparison."

¹² *Ibid.*

With 28 percent growth throughout the past four years, the PACT Board invested 72 percent of its funds in equities, while other states with higher growth rates in tuition invested an average of only 58.9 percent. On the other hand, the three states with the largest increases in tuition and fees—Indiana, Kentucky, and Michigan—had equity ratios of no more than 65.4 percent. Only Mississippi’s program had a higher ratio of equities to fixed income investments than Alabama.

How Did the Current Recession Affect Similar Programs in Other States?

As equities were the hardest hit during the market collapse, those programs most heavily invested in equities suffered as a result, but none to the same degree as Alabama. Because Alabama’s PACT program was extremely dependent upon the equities for its funding, it suffered considerably more than other programs that had better ratios of other investments. According to an independent auditor’s report on PACT for fiscal year 2009, its assets fell from \$817.2 million in 2007 to \$571.1 million in 2009, a 30 percent loss (see Table 2).¹³ In fact, of the 13 states examined in this paper, Alabama’s \$246 million loss from 2007 to 2009 was the largest dollar loss in assets of any program in the nation.

Table 2: Changes in Total Asset Values for PACTs, by State: 2007-2009¹⁴

State	Assets		Change: 2007-09	
	2007	2009	\$	%
Alabama	\$ 817,167,890	\$ 571,183,288	\$ (245,984,602)	-30.1%
Florida	11,243,895,973	11,021,119,360	(222,776,613)	-2.0
Illinois	993,655,394	958,664,772	(34,990,622)	-3.5
Kentucky	157,302,703	115,189,662	(42,113,041)	-26.8
Maryland	722,146,000	620,727,000	(101,419,000)	-14.0
Michigan	608,899,000	589,643,148	(19,255,852)	-3.2
Mississippi	224,712,565	184,842,683	(39,869,882)	-17.7
Nevada	124,895,723	110,579,836	(14,315,887)	-11.5
South Carolina	165,624,871 ^a	125,417,560 ^a	(40,207,311)	-24.3
Virginia	1,881,424,117	1,658,978,039	(222,446,078)	-11.8
Tennessee	97,441,819	83,225,900 ^a	(14,215,919)	-14.6
Washington	935,960,012	1,066,515,281	130,555,269	13.9
West Virginia	113,490,029	79,148,355	(34,341,674)	-30.3
Total	\$18,086,616,096	\$17,185,234,884	\$(901,381,212)	
Average	\$1,391,278,161	\$1,321,941,145	\$(69,337,016)	-13.5%

^a Unaudited actuarial data used instead of audited annual financial reports.

What Steps Can Be Taken to Make PACT Solvent?

While it is true that Alabama’s PACT program has lost more funding than any of its sister programs, it is not alone when it comes to searching for ways to stay solvent.

¹³ Mauldin & Jenkins CPA, LLC, “Alabama Prepaid Affordable College Tuition Program: Financial Report – September 30, 2009,” p. 19. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/yg2easx>. Access verified March 31, 2010.

¹⁴ Annual reports from individual states’ prepaid tuition programs.

In November 2009, the state of Washington's Guaranteed Education Tuition (GET) program was funded at only 84 percent. To help ensure the continued solvency of the program, the Office of the State Actuary produced a report detailing the condition of the GET program and offering a variety of actuarial models to show funding levels would be affected if certain choices were made to fix the program.¹⁵ Alabamians have many of the same choices when it comes to the future of the PACT program, some of which could be enacted simultaneously.

A. Maintain the status quo. In Alabama, this would mean re-opening the program to new enrollees and guaranteeing the contracts of all participants. If this were to happen without other changes, though, the likelihood of Alabama's PACT program needing a complete bailout in the near future is almost certain. And, by doing nothing, the bill to Alabama's taxpayers would likely be hundreds of millions of dollars more than the program's current liability.

B. Suspend the program. By permanently suspending the PACT program and closing it to new enrollees (which is its current status), the program is able to limit its future liability. This option, in fact, was used in Ohio and Texas when the solvency of the program was in jeopardy.¹⁶ Unlike discontinuing the program altogether, existing account holders would still be affected by investment returns and tuition costs. However, as with maintaining the status quo, there is a very strong possibility that the PACT program would need contributions from the state to become solvent.

C. Lower the program's ratio of equities to fixed income to 30 percent equities and 70 percent fixed income. With a lower ratio of equities to fixed income investments, the risk of investment loss is substantially smaller. (In the case of Washington's GET program, investment volatility dropped from 10.1 percent to 6.5 percent). On the other hand, investment returns become smaller, making the initial price of college tuition units higher. This could be a disincentive for some families, as it would be less affordable for them to invest larger sums in the program.¹⁷

D. Raise the program's ratio of equities to fixed income to 80 percent equities and 20 percent fixed income. This option is the opposite of the previous one, raising the risk of asset loss in exchange for the possibility of higher returns. One advantage of this option (and a possible reason for Alabama's PACT program to have pursued this course of action in the recent past) is that the likelihood of higher returns makes the cost of investment in the program considerably cheaper, which could entice some families to invest.

The disadvantages of increasing the ratio of equities to fixed income investments, though, as every Alabamian who has invested in the PACT program knows, are significant. Another catastrophic loss in the stock market could make the program's liabilities two to three times higher than their present levels, making a state bailout almost certain. (In the case of

¹⁵ State of Washington, Office of the State Actuary, "Financial Solvency Study: Guaranteed Education Tuition (GET) Program." November 13, 2009.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Washington's GET program, worst-case state contributions to the program almost tripled, from \$9.0 billion for maintaining the status quo to \$26.2 billion).¹⁸

E. Reduce the state's tuition growth rate. As mentioned earlier in this report, Alabama's resident, undergraduate tuition rate for the 2008-09 school year grew at a faster rate than all but two other states. If this rate of growth could be slowed or even capped, the volatility of tuition increases could be better managed, making investments into the PACT program more certain and reducing the chance of a state contribution. Another beneficial effect would be that the price of tuition units would be more predictable, and thus more affordable for families who are investing in PACT.¹⁹

A serious disadvantage to the program would be that reducing the tuition growth rate is akin to price fixing. This could hurt the market for higher education by making public colleges and universities—which are typically cheaper than private ones—even more attractive, which would hurt the ability of private schools to compete for students and funds.

F. Change the assumptions in the state's tuition growth rate. As mentioned earlier, the assumed growth rate for tuition for the PACT program is 7.45 percent, up from last year's assumption of 7.25 percent. By raising the assumed growth rate of tuition, each unit of college tuition becomes slightly more expensive, making it harder for families to reach their savings goals and ultimately discouraging some families from buying into the PACT program. However, by changing the assumptions to reflect a more aggressive rate of growth, the likelihood of a state contribution is lowered because tuition units are more accurately priced.

G. Increase participation in the PACT program. In Washington, when revenues to the GET program were modeled with a 10 percent increase in participants (and their current price-setting strategies were left unchanged), the larger pool of participants made more dollars available in reserve and reduced the likelihood of a state bailout. Moreover, annual increases in premiums remained low.

In Alabama, though, it would be difficult to increase participation—or even return it to 2007 levels—given the abysmal track record of the program in the past two years. In order for participation levels to rise, Alabama might need to follow the example of Texas, which suspended new enrollees in its first program (The Texas Guaranteed Tuition Plan) and started another one (The Texas Tuition Promise Fund), which “shifts the tuition risk associated with the new plan to the state's public universities and colleges, thereby reducing the need for a program reserve and allowing the program to peg unit prices at current tuition levels.”²⁰

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

²⁰ SavingforCollege.com. “Texas rolls out new prepaid plan.” September 12, 2008. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/y995nkk>. Access verified April 7, 2010.

H. Change price-setting guidelines. The way that many prepaid tuition programs in the nation stay actuarially sound is by maintaining a “stabilization reserve,” which covers past losses and unexpected future costs. In the state of Washington, if the stabilization reserve for the GET program falls below 106 percent, the committee in charge of the program increases the reserve component by 2 percent per year until the program reaches 106 percent or higher. By changing the reserve component from a minimum of 8 percent to a minimum of 10 percent, and by changing the minimum to 20 percent should the program’s funded status fall below 80 percent, the GET program does eliminate much of its risk.²¹ If Alabama’s PACT program is to continue, a flexible stabilization reserve could help it manage short-term changes in tuition costs, investment returns, and purchaser behavior.

I. Receive a one-time infusion of money from the State Legislature. If the Alabama Legislature decided to pay out a fixed amount to stabilize the PACT program, there is no guarantee that the infusion of funds would completely eliminate the risk of insolvency. This is because the infusion would become a part of the larger fund and subject to the same levels of volatility and dynamics.²² And, over time, the infusion’s effects would be completely mitigated, especially if the program were re-opened to new enrollees.

J. Lower the future payout value for new enrollees. If Alabama’s PACT program were to re-open, but put a limit on the number of tuition units a family could buy (or that the PACT program could sell), the possibility of insolvency would be marginally reduced because the program would have fewer total assets at risk. The cost of tuition units would also be more affordable, but fewer families might buy them, as they might consider the program to be a less profitable investment.

K. Terminate the program. If the PACT program were ended, the only advantages to the state would be: (1) the state would immediately know the exact amount it would need to pay out to erase the program’s liability; (2) this payout would likely be much lower than that of other options, including re-opening the program without changes or maintaining the status quo (i.e., not accepting new enrollees).²³

Legislative Action

On April 22, 2010 the State Legislature approved an amended bill (SB162) to pay \$547.6 million over 13 years to subsidize the PACT program. The bill, which was originally introduced by Sens. Ted Little (D-Auburn), Lowell Barron (D-Fyffe), and Hinton Mitchem (D-Guntersville) in January, will allow the PACT program to begin drawing funds from the state’s Education Trust Fund in 2015 to cover the anticipated shortfall for the 44,000 children in existing contracts.²⁴

²¹ State of Washington, Office of the State Actuary, “Financial Solvency Study: Guaranteed Education Tuition (GET) Program.” p. 33.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²⁴ John Peck, “PACT a Reasonable Fix – But...” *Huntsville Times*, April 26, 2010. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/3y8frdy>. Access verified June 10, 2010; David White, “Tax Flaw Removed, Alabama Legislature Approves PACT Bill.” *Birmingham News*, April 23, 2010. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/26qmgza>. Access verified June 10, 2010.

The legislation to rescue the PACT is not without controversy, though. In addition to fully funding existing PACT contracts, it limits tuition and mandatory fee increases to 2.5 percent per year for all two- and four-year state colleges and universities except Auburn University and the University of Alabama. In the 2008-09 school year, 55 percent of all college students in the PACT program went to one of these schools. Consequently, several legislators and representatives from the state's smaller two- and four-year schools have called the cap unfair because it will force smaller schools to do more with less, while non-PACT students will face higher tuition and fee increases.²⁵

Conclusion

If Alabama's PACT program is to meet or satisfy its obligations to its participants, it must make changes to ensure its solvency, particularly if it is to ever re-open to new enrollees.

First, it must lower its ratio of equities to fixed income investments to a balance that is more in line with the national average of about 60 percent equities and 40 percent fixed income. At the same time, this ratio must not become too dependent upon lower-performing fixed income investments, as it could raise the price of tuition units, making the program less cost-effective for all participants still paying into it.²⁶

Second, if the PACT remains closed to new enrollees, it must continue to bring in revenues to offset future gains in tuition, as well as to erase its current losses. To reduce the likelihood of future losses, the program's assumption of the state's tuition growth rate could be increased, which would translate into requiring larger deposits from its participants.

Making up the large losses already sustained by the PACT program is considerably more difficult. At present, every solution requires either a direct contribution by the state, a loan by the state or one of its agencies (which might not be repaid in full), or it passes the risk to another body that could suffer the same fate as the PACT program has since 2007.

Finally, if the decision is made to re-open the PACT program to new enrollees, an adjustable stabilization reserve should be created to help the program adapt to short-term changes in tuition costs, investment returns, and purchaser behavior. The risk of insolvency could be further reduced by increasing the projection of the state's average annual tuition growth rate and/or lowering the value of payouts to new participants. Either of these choices, though, runs the risk of making the program unattractive to some would-be enrollees.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ At present, among the states examined in this report, this is about 52 percent equities, 42 percent stocks, and 6 percent real estate/cash or cash equivalents/other investments.

Appendix A: 529 Plans by State and Features²⁷

In Study?	Plan	State	Notes
No	Independent 529 Plan	National	Ongoing enrollment. The Plan covers 274 private colleges in 38 states and the District of Columbia.
Yes	Prepaid Affordable College Tuition (PACT) Program	Alabama	Closed to new enrollment since 1/1/09, but is open to contributions for existing accounts.
No	Prepaid Tuition Fund	Colorado	Not accepting contributions or new enrollments since August 1, 2002.
Yes	Florida Prepaid College Plan	Florida	Ongoing enrollment.
Yes	College Illinois! 529 Prepaid Tuition Program	Illinois	Ongoing enrollment.
Yes	Kentucky's Affordable Prepaid Tuition (KAPT)	Kentucky	Closed to new enrollment since 2004, but is open to contributions for existing accounts.
Yes	College Savings Plans of Maryland – Prepaid College Trust	Maryland	Current enrollment period: December 1, 2009 through April 5, 2010; year-round for newborns. Available to Maryland and District of Columbia families.
No	U.Plan	Massachusetts	Not a true 529 plan, the Massachusetts Educational Financing Authority (MEFA) U. PLAN places 100 percent of its contributions in "tuition certificates," which are backed by Massachusetts general obligation bonds.
Yes	Michigan Education Trust	Michigan	Current enrollment period: 11/2/09 – 6/30/10.
Yes	Mississippi Prepaid Affordable College Tuition (MPACT) Program	Mississippi	Open to enrollment from 9/1 – 12/31 each year.
Yes	Nevada Prepaid Tuition Program	Nevada	Current enrollment period: 12/1/09 – 2/28/10, continuing through 6/30/10 for newborns.
No	Ohio College Advantage Guaranteed Savings Fund	Ohio	Fund has suspended new accounts and contributions since 2003.
No	Pennsylvania 529 Guaranteed Savings Plan	Pennsylvania	Ongoing enrollment: However, insufficient data was available to make year-by-year comparisons.
Yes	South Carolina Tuition Prepayment Program	South Carolina	Closed to new enrollment since 2006, but is open to contributions for existing accounts.
Yes	Tennessee's BEST Prepaid College Tuition Plan	Tennessee	Year-round enrollment.
No	Texas Guaranteed Tuition Plan	Texas	Closed to new enrollment since 2006, but is open to contributions for existing accounts. However, insufficient data was available to make year-by-year comparisons.
No	Texas Tuition Promise Fund	Texas	Enrollment: 9/1 – 2/28. This plan, which began in 2008, shifts the tuition risk to the state's public universities and colleges, enabling it to offer units at current tuition levels.
Yes	Virginia Prepaid Education Program (VPEP)	Virginia	Current enrollment period: 12/1/09 – 3/31/10.
Yes	Guaranteed Education Tuition (GET)	Washington	Current enrollment period: 9/15/09 – 3/31/10. Parents of children less than 1 year old may enroll at any time.
Yes	SMART 529 Prepaid Tuition Plan	West Virginia	Closed to new enrollment since 2003, but is open to contributions for existing accounts.

²⁷ Savingforcollege.com. "529 Plans." Available at <http://tinyurl.com/ycb9bbw>. Access verified April 6, 2010.